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Abstract
The paper analyzes the effects of the change of the income distribution on the equilibrium
outcomes in the duopoly-quality model with quantity competition. The analysis results show that
with zero quality-cost and an income inequality not too high, then both firms always choose the
highest quality level. If the quality-cost is convex, then the average quality level will decrease and
the vertical differentiation level will increase in the income inequality. These results are different
from the Yurko (2011), who made a similar analysis under the quality-price competition model.
Another contribution of the paper is that it gives the sufficient conditions for the single firm to
choose multiple levels of the quality, i.e. the quality-cost function is convex, vertical differentiation
is large enough, and the marginal cost is not too high.
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1 Introduction
One important topic in the economics of industrial organization is to study the impact of income
inequality on prices and quality levels. The recent empirical studies also show that the income distri-
bution does affect the equilibrium variables of the market. Frankel (2001) studied the effect of income
inequality on retail prices, using US data. He found that an increase in the presence of lower-middle
income households, relative to poor or upper income households, is associated with lower prices. In
other studies, Krueger and Perri (2006) and Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) found that consumption
patterns change in response to changes in income inequality. Benassi, Chirco, and Colombo (2006)
analyzed the effects of the income distribution on the quality of the products under a quality-price
competition model. They found that lower income inequality will lead to lower product quality. In
another paper, Yurko (2011) studied the change of the products’ average quality provided by the firms
in response to the variety of the income inequality. Yurko (2011) also reached the similar conclusion
that high average quality is associated with high level of income inequality. The bulk of the litera-
ture on this subject assumes that firms compete in prices after they have selected their quality levels.
Furthermore, most authors assume that firms do not incur additional costs when they increase their
quality levels. However, the results may alter under the Cournot model because the main factor that
leads to the results in the Bertrand model is the high intensity of the competition. The intensity of the
competition under the Cournot model is much less alleviated than the Bertrand model. Considering
the Cournot competition exists in many industries, it is necessary to study the issue under the Cournot
model. The main purpose of the paper is to study the effects of the income inequality on the outcomes
under the assumption that firms set quantities (rather than prices) after they have chosen their quality
levels. The contributions of this paper include: firstly, it is the first one to analyze the correlation
between the product’s quality and the income inequality under the Cournot model; secondly, it is the
first paper to study the within-firm vertical differentiation, i.e. the single firm chooses multiple quality
levels of the products.
This paper shows that if the cost of quality-improvement is zero and the income inequality is not
too high, then both firms will choose the highest quality level. With the quadratic form of quality-cost
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and the lognormal form of income distributions, when the income inequality enlarges, the vertical
differentiation level increases, but the average quality decreases. These results, obtained under the
assumption of quantity competition rather than price competition, are different from those of the
Yurko (2011), which assumes the quality-Bertrand model. In Yurko (2011), no matter what the cost
structure is, the average quality level is always increasing and the vertical differentiation is decreasing
in the income inequality. The paper also discusses the situation when the single firm is allowed to
choose more than one level of the quality. This assumption is more in line with reality, though in the
existing literature the typical assumption is that each firm can only choose one quality level. This
paper shows that in the monopolistic market the firm will vertically differentiate its products if the
cost is non-linear and increasing in both the quality level and the quantity of the products. In the case
of a duopoly, the necessary condition for the firms to make within-firm vertical differentiation is that
the cost function is increasing in quantity and convex in the quality-level.
2 Literature review
Benassi, Chirco, and Colombo (2006) analyzed the effects of the income distribution on the vertical
differentiation and the market structure under a quality-Bertrand competition model. They assumed
zero cost on quality investment and the consumers’ income follow the trapezoid distribution. Under this
construction, they reach the result that a more centralized income distribution will expand the vertical
differentiation. The intuition of the result is that the higher income concentration stimulates the
market competition and this effect can only be damped by the enlarging of the vertical differentiation.
In another paper, Yurko (2011) analyzes the change of the average quality of the products in response
to increases in the income inequality under the assumptions of free entry and Bertrand competition.
She found that when the income become more unequal, more firms will enter the market and then the
market competition will become more intensive. Then the average quality of the products will increase
because firms compete for the shrinking share of higher-income consumers. Although Benassi, Chirco,
and Colombo (2006) and Yurko (2011) obtained the same conclusion about the change of quality
in response to the change of the income distribution, their underlying mechanisms are different. In
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Benassi, Chirco, and Colombo (2006) the market competition takes place in the middle-income group,
meanwhile in Yurko (2011) the competition occurs in the market serving the high income costumers.
When the income inequality becomes larger, the market competition becomes less fierce in Benassi,
Chirco, and Colombo (2006) but becomes more intensive in Yurko (2011). In Benassi, Chirco, and
Colombo (2006) the moderated market competition allows the low quality firm to narrow the quality
gap relative to the high quality firm. In contrast in Yurko (2011), the enhanced competition induces
the firms to raise the quality level in order to attract the wealthier consumers.
Several papers have studied quality choice when firms compete in quantity. However, none of
them analyzed the effects of the change of the market characteristics on the market outcomes. Bo-
nanno (1986) discussed the properties of the vertical differentiation model with both the Bertrand and
Cournot types of competition. He reached the conclusion that there exists subgame-perfect Nash equi-
librium under the quality-Cournot competition, and both firms will choose the highest level of quality.
He also discussed the results when quality improvement involves a cost. Bonanno (1986) assumes that
each firm must choose a quality level greater than a threshold c which is strictly positive. He claimed
that if the cost is high then one firm will choose the lowest level of quality meanwhile the other firm
stays with the highest level of the quality. The difference of the cost function between Bonanno (1986)
and our setting is that in our paper the quality is chosen from the range starting from zero and the
cost is increasing in the quality-level. In our analysis, if the firm chooses zero quality, which means the
firm exits the market. Displacing the lower bound of the quality range makes the setting more closed
to the reality. Another significant difference between Bonanno’s model and our model is that in our
model, the range of consumer valuation of quality changes as the support of the income distribution
changes. In another paper, Frascatore (2002) explored the situation where the cost of the quality-
improvement depends on the quality levels chosen by both firms. Frascatore argues that the cost for
a firm of achieving a quality level depends on the quality level of the other firm. Thus, if the quality
level of firm 1 is S1 and the quality level of firm 2 is S2, Frascatore assumes that the cost of quality is a
function of the summation, i.e. S = S1 + S2. With this assumption and under the Cournot model, he
found that one firm will choose a positive level of quality but the other firm will choose zero quality.
In another paper, Motta (1993) compared the results between the Bertrand and Cournot models with
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assuming a convex cost function for the quality-improvement. He found that with such type of cost
structure, the firms will differentiate the quality in both the Bertrand and the Cournot model. Motta
(1993) also compared the social welfare under the both models, and reached the conclusion that the
social welfare associated with the Bertrand model is always higher than the Cournot model. Our paper
also compares the results from both models. Contrary to the results of Motta (1993), our model shows
that if the marginal cost of the quality is constant and high enough, then the social welfare of the
Bertrand model will be lower than the Cournot model. Unlike the models that I surveyed above, which
assume that a consumer buys at most one unit of the differentiated good, Symeonidis (2003) assumes
that a consumer can choose the number of units she buys from each duopolist. The utility function
is quadratic in quantities. He reached the conclusion that when the R&D spillovers is high enough or
the vertical differentiation is low enough, then the welfare in the Bertrand model will be lower than
the Cournot model. Both Symeonidis (2003) and our analysis show that under certain conditions, the
Bertrand model is not more efficient than the Cournot model.
The other key papers which analyze the quality-Cournot model include Lambertini and Tampieri
(2012a), Lambertini and Tampieri (2012b), Aoki (2003), Nguyen, Sgro, and Nabin (2014), Andaluz
(2010), and Hergueraa, Kujalb , Petrakisc (2000). Lambertini and Tampieri (2012a) explored the
behaviors of the firms in providing the environmental friendly products and reached the conclusion
that the Porter-type result holds in this model. The Porter-type result means that the social welfare
will increase with government intervention in the market. In another paper, Lambertini and Tampieri
(2012b) assumed that firms participate in Stackelberg competition in the stage of choosing qualities
and make simultaneous quantity competition. The analytical result shows that the low quality firm
prefers to be the leader in choosing the quality. Aoki (2003) compared the equilibrium quality levels
between the sequential and simultaneous types of games under both the Bertrand and Cournot models.
He showed that under the Bertrand model the equilibrium qualities will be lower in the sequential game
than the simultaneous game. Meanwhile under the Cournot model, the high quality will be higher but
the low quality will be lower in the sequential game than the simultaneous game. Nguyen, Sgro, and
Nabin (2014) studied the welfare effects of the endogenous choice of the cost structure in the quality-
improvement process under both the Bertrand and Cournot models. They assumed that the domestic
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firms could choose two methods to improve the quality levels: first one is making quality-investment
by themselves with a convex cost function; the second one is to buy license from the foreign firm
with the lump-sum cost. They found that licensing raises domestic welfare, and the welfare is higher
in Bertrand than in Cournot competition regardless of the cost structure. Andaluz (2010) studied
the stability of the collusion in both the quality-Bertrand and the quality-Cournot models. He found
that the effect of the vertical differentiation on the sustainability of the collusion is unclear, but the
collusion is more stable in the Bertrand model than the Cournot model. Hergueraa, Kujalb , and
Petrakisc (2000) studied the effects of the quota restrictions on the quality choice by the export firms.
They found that if the import country imposes quota restrictions, then the low quality firm would
increase the quality level and the high quality firm would keep the same quality level as before the
imposition of the quantity restrictions.
Another important contribution of the paper is that it discusses the conditions for the change of
the market structures between the covered and uncovered under the Cournot model. It also discusses
the conditions for the existence of the sub-perfect Nash equilibrium under the Cournot model. The
discussions provide important fundamentals to the studies of the relevant issues. The first paper
which discussed the boundaries of the market structures is Wauthy (1996). The author discussed the
conditions for the holding of each type of market structures (uncovered market, covered market with
the corner solution, and with the interior solution) under a quality-Bertrand model and assuming zero
quality-cost. In our analysis, we extend the discussion under the quality-Cournot competition model.
The last contribution of the paper is that it explores the cost structures and other conditions that
gives incentives for a single firm to provide the multiple levels of quality in both the monopolistic and
duopolistic markets. This issue was rarely studied before. We found three similar literature on this
topic, i.e. Mussa and Rosen (1978), Crawford and Shum (2007), and Garella and Lambertini (1999).
Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Crawford and Shum (2007) discussed the multiple choices of the quality
levels by the monopoly-firm. Lambertini (1999) considered a vertically differentiated duopoly where
product quality is assumed as the combination of the good and bad characteristics. Consumers obtain
positive utility from the good characteristics and negative utility form the bad characteristics. They
reached the results that firms would differentiate the good characteristics but chose the same level of
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the bad characteristics. In our study, the single firm could provide the products with multiple levels of
quality and the market structures are either monopolistic or duopolistic. The analytical results show
that, the firm needs to consider the substitute and the cost effects when deciding the provision of the
product’s quality.
The paper is constructed as followings: section 3 provides the basic models to discuss the effects
of the change of income distribution on the market outcomes; the first part of the section 3 explores
the case with zero quality-cost, and the second part of the section studies the case with a quadratic
quality-cost function; section 4 makes some extensions based on the fundamental models in section
3, i.e. compare the social welfare between the Cournot and Bertrand models, and investigates the
conditions for the single firm to choose multiple levels of quality.
3 Theoretical Models
Our model adopts the traditional formulation of vertical product differentiation. There are two
firms, i = 1, 2, producing the same type product, and choosing the quality of the product within the
range [0, S¯], i.e. S ∈[0, S¯]. The firms make competition in two stages. In the first stage, both of
them choose the quality level simultaneously, and then in the second stage the firms engage in the
price or quantity competition. Assume the production cost in the second stage is zero and the cost
of improving the quality of the products in the first stage is denoted by C(S). The quality, quantity
and price chosen by firm i are denoted as Si, Xi and Pi respectively, where i =1,2. Without loss of
generality, we assume S1 ≤ S2. The utility function for consumer t is Ut = θtSi−Pi, where θt indexes
the preference level of the consumer towards the product’s quality. We assume that each consumer can
purchase no more than one unit of the product. Another convenient assumption is that the consumer
with higher income would have higher level of the preference. This assumption is reasonable, because
the utility function Vt = Si − Piθt is equivalent to Ut under the settings of the game. We may suppose
that given purchasing the same product, the expenditures will be the same, but the rich people will
lose less utility from the expenditures than the poor people. In this case, we can index the consumer’s
income as θ. To simplify the analysis, the income distribution is defined in the range[0, θ¯] and the CDF,
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PDF are denoted as F (θ) and f(θ) respectively. The consumer with income θt will choose to buy the
product i rather than buying nothing if Ut(θt, Pi) > 0, and he will buy the product j rather than i if
Ut(θt, Pi) > Ut(θt, Pj). Denote the type of consumer who is indifferent between choosing low quality
product and nothing as θL, the type who is indifferent between choosing high and low quality product
as θI , and the type who is indifferent between choosing the high quality product and nothing as θH .
Using the utility function specified above, we can obtain the following results: θL =
P1
S1
, θH =
P2
S2
, and
θI =
P2−P1
S2−S1 . Then we further get the following relation: θI ≥ θH ≥ θL. In this case, the consumer
whose income is higher than θI will buy the high quality products, and the consumers between the
type θL and θI will buy the low quality products. The consumers whose income is lower than θL will
choose to buy nothing. Figure 1 describes the market for each type of the product. Following Yurko
(2011), we study the issue with two cases, the case with zero quality-improvement cost and the case
with the quadratic form of the quality cost, i.e. C(S) = c · S2. We assume the production cost in the
second stage is zero in both cases.
Figure 1. The markets for the high and low quality products
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3.1 Income inequality and market outcomes with zero cost
3.1.1 Basic results with uniform type of income distribution
To simplify the analysis, let us at first consider the case of a uniform distribution with the support being
the range θ ∼ U [θ−, θ+], and the quality-cost is zero. In this case the PDF of the θ is f(θ) = 1θ+−θ− .
As θ is non-negative, so we need the lower bound of the distribution is non-negative, i.e. θ− ≥ 0.
Figure 2. Income distribution with the uniform type
The competition follows two stages. At the first stage, the firms choose their own quality level
of the products, and at the second stage, the firms engage in quantity or price competition given
the quality chosen in the first stage. We assume for the moment that in equilibrium, the market is
uncovered, meaning there are consumers that do not buy the product. Denote the type of consumer
who is indifferent between purchasing the low quality product and nothing as θL, i.e. θLS1 − P1 = 0,
then θL =
P1
S1
. Denote the type of consumer who is indifferent between purchasing product 1 and 2 as
θI , i.e. θIS1 − P1 = θIS2 − P2, then θI = P2−P1S2−S1 . In this case we can get the demand functions of
firm 1 and 2 as the followings:

D1 =
∫ θI
θL
1
θ+−θ− dθ
D2 =
∫ µ+δ
θI
1
θ+−θ− dθ
(1)
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whereθL =
P1
S1
and θI =
P2−P1
S1−S2 .
Then we get the demand functions for firm 1 and 2 as:

X1 =
1
θ+−θ− (
P2−P1
S2−S1 − P1S1 )
X2 =
1
θ+−θ− [θ
+ − P2−P1S2−S1 ]
(2)
Re-ranging the formula (2), we further get the inverse demand functions.

P1 = [θ
+ − (θ+ − θ−) · (X1 +X2)]S1
P2 = [θ
+ − (θ+ − θ−) ·X2]S2 − (θ+ − θ−)S1X1
(3)
The formula (3) can be seen as an example of the inverse demand function of the differentiated
Cournot model specified by Dixit (1979) and Singh and Vives (1984), i.e. P1 = A1−α1X1−α2X2 and
P2 = A2 − β1X1 − β2X2. As the competition follows two stages, so we need to solve the equilibrium
quantities given the product’s quality in the second stage, and then solve the optimal qualities in the
first stage. Assume the cost of the production and quality-improving processes is zero, then the profit
function for each firm can be specified as:

pi1 = X1[θ
+ − (θ+ − θ−) · (X1 +X2)]S1
pi2 = X2{[θ+ − (θ+ − θ−) ·X2]S2 − (θ+ − θ−) · S1X1}
P1 ≥ S1θ−
(4)
The inequality condition in (4) guarantees that the consumer who is indifferent between choosing
low quality products and nothing is higher than the lower bound. Take first order conditions of pi1
and pi2 with respect to X1 and X2 respectively, we get:

∂pi1
∂X1
= θ+S1 − 2(θ+ − θ−) · S1X1 − (θ+ − θ−) · S1X2 = 0
∂pi2
∂X2
= θ+S2 − 2(θ+ − θ−) · S2X2 − (θ+ − θ−) · S1X1 = 0
(5)
As the second order conditions of the formula in (5) are all negative, i.e. ∂
2pi1
∂X21
= −2(θ+−θ−)S1 < 0
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and ∂
2pi2
∂X22
= −2(θ+ − θ−)S2 < 0, so the optimal quantities are solved as the followings:

X∗1 =
θ+
θ+−θ− · S24S2−S1
X∗2 =
θ+
θ+−θ− · 2S2−S14S2−S1
(6)
Further, we can obtain the equilibrium prices as:

P1 = θ
+ · S1S24S2−S1
P2 = θ
+ · 2(S2−S1)S24S2−S1
(7)
Then we can write out the profits functions for both firms in the first stage in terms of S1and S2:

V1 =
θ+2
θ+−θ− · S1S
2
2
(4S2−S1)2
V2 =
θ+2
θ+−θ− · S2(2S2−S1)
2
(4S2−S1)2
(8)
Take first order conditions of the formula in the set (8) with respect to S1 and S2 respectively, we
get:

∂V1
∂S1
= θ
+2
θ+−θ− · S
2
2(4S2+S1)
(4S2−S1)3
∂V2
∂S2
= θ
+2
θ+−θ− · (8S
2
2−2S1S2+S21)(2S2−S1)
(4S2−S1)3
(9)
Denote the vector for the first order conditions of the profits functions as V =
 ∂V1∂S1
∂V2
∂S2
, and the
vector of qualities as S =
 S1
S2
. Then the Hessian matrix is calculated as the followings:
[∂V ] [∂S]
−1
=
[
∂2V1
∂S21
∂2V2
∂S1∂S2
∂2V1
∂S1∂S2
∂2V2
∂S22
]
=
θ+2
θ+ − θ−
[
2S22(8S2−S1)
(4S2−S1)4 ,
8S2(S2−S1)S1
(4S2−S1)4
− 2S1S2(S1+8S2)(4S2−S1)4 ,
8S21(S1−S2)
(4S2−S1)4
]
(10)
According to the Hessian matrix and the condition S1 ≤ S2, it is obviously that ∂2V1∂S21 > 0 and
∂2V1
∂S1∂S2
< 0. Thus, we can get the following optimal levels of the price, quantity, quality, and profits
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for each firm. Lemma 1 summarizes the property of the equilibrium qualities with the uniform type
of the income distribution. The same results were also obtained by Bonanno (1986).
X∗1 = X
∗
2 =
1
3
· θ
+
θ+ − θ− (11)
P ∗1 = P
∗
2 =
1
3
θ+S¯ (12)
V ∗1 = V
∗
2 = [
1
9
· θ
+2
θ+ − θ− ]S¯ (13)
Lemma 1. Consider a duopoly where firms set quality levels in stage one and engage in quantity
competition in stage two. Assume that in equilibrium the market is uncovered, and that quality cost is
zero. Then both firms will choose the highest quality level. (See the proof in Appendix)
For this equilibrium to be consistent with the assumption of uncovered market, and with the
requirement that the sum of outputs is less than the population, the ratio θ
+
θ− must be greater than
three. This will be discussed in full below. Next, we will discuss under what conditions the subgame-
perfect Nash equilibrium will be unique. Because the Cournot competition only exists in the uncovered
market, the range of θ
+
θ− which defines the uncovered market is also the definition range of the Cournot
competition. This requires that θL =
P∗1
S∗1
= 13θ
+ ≥ θ−. This restriction, together with the requirement
that the sum of outputs is smaller than the population size (X1+X2 must be less than 1), is equivalent
to the condition that θ
+
θ− ∈ (3, +∞). However, it is easy to show that in the range θ
+
θ− ∈ (3, 4], if firm
1 chooses some alternative level of quality such that S1 < S
∗
1 , then the market may be covered. In
another words, θ
+
θ− ∈ (3,+∞) is only the necessary condition for the holding of the uncovered market.
Furthermore, we prove that when θ
+
θ− ∈ (4,+∞), then P1 = θ+ · S1S24S2−S1 ≥ θ− for any S1 ∈ [0, S2] (the
market is uncovered under this condition). In another words, θ
+
θ− ∈ (4,+∞) is the sufficient condition
for the formation of the uncovered market. Firm 1 may deviate from the optimal level and then the
market will be covered in the range θ
+
θ− ∈ (3, 4]. We need to compare the profits obtained from the
covered and uncovered market structures to decide whether firm 1 will deviate in the range θ
+
θ− ∈ (3, 4].
Unfortunately, this comparison is difficulty to make because in the have proved that if the market is
covered, there will be unlimited number of equilibria. (See the proof of proposition 1 in Appendix)
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Based on the discussion, we obtain the following proposition directly.
Proposition 1. In a duopoly market with quality-quantity competition, zero quality-cost, and
the consumers are uniformly distributed in the range [θ−, θ+], then the unique subgame-perfect Nash
equilibrium exists in the range θ
+
θ− ∈ (4,+∞), i.e. both firms choose the same highest level of product’s
quality; there are infinite Nash equilibria within the range θ
+
θ− ∈ [0, 3]; and the number of the Nash
equilibrium in the range θ
+
θ− ∈ (3, 4] is uncertainty. (See the proof in Appendix)
Figure 3. Quantity-strategies and the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium
3.1.2 Results with more general type of income distribution
In this section, we will relax the uniform distribution assumption and explore the choice of quality
levels by the firms in more general type of income distribution. Denote the CDF and PDF of the
income distribution as F (θ) and f(θ) respectively, and assume the definition range is θ ∈ [0, θ¯]. If we
continue to assume zero quality and production cost, the theoretical analysis shows that firm 1 will
always choose the same level of quality as firm 2 if the level of the income inequality is not too high.
The following proposition summarizes this property.
Proposition 2. Consider a duopoly with quality-quantity competition, where higher quality does
not cost more. Assume that the income distribution has the following properties:
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[1] F (θ) invertible and twice differentiable, i.e. the inverse CDF and PDF are G(Ω) and g(Ω)
respectively, and g′(Ω) exists;
[2] Assume θm is the mode of the distribution, i.e. f
′(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ [0, θm) and f ′(θ) ≤ 0 for
θ ∈ [θm, θ¯];
[3] [1− F (θ)]−f ′(θ)[f(θ)]2 ≤ 2 for θ ∈ [θm, θ¯];
[4] [1−F (θ)]θf(θ) ≤ 1 for θ ∈ [θm, θ¯].
Then both firms in the market will choose the highest level of quality, i.e. S∗1 = S
∗
2 = S¯. (See the
proof in Appendix)
Figure 4. Example of the general form of income distribution
We check the cases of uniform, and triangular distributions in the range θ ∈ [0, 1], and the lognormal
distribution in the range θ ∈ [0,+∞). We found that the uniform distribution and the symmetric
triangular distribution follow the conditions [1]-[4], and the lognormal distribution lnN (µ, σ2) follows
the conditions [1]-[4] for all µ = 0 and σ ≤ 0.5. In this case, we can conclude that if the income
distribution changes under some specific conditions, then the quality levels by firm 1 and 2 do not
change under the quality-Cournot model. These results are different from those of Yurko (2011), where
the author predicts that under the quality-Bertrand model with zero cost, when the income inequality
gets larger, the quality by firm 2 doesn’t change but firm 1 will choose higher level of quality. Recall
14
that proposition 2 provides only the sufficient conditions, thus we also check the numerical results
with the lognormal distributions with Gini coefficients ranging from 0.15 to 0.85. When we change the
inequality level, we need to exclude the effects from change of the mean of the income. In this case, we
follow the Yurko (2011) and choose the pair of µ and σ to target a certain value of the Gini coefficient
meanwhile keeping a constant mean of consumer’s income. The computation results show that firm 1
and 2 always choose the highest level of quality no matter how the income inequality changes. Another
patterns of the results are that the sales volume and price level decreasing in the income inequality.
The explanation for the change of the sales and prices will be discussed in next section. (See Figure 5
or the table 1 and 2 in Appendix)
Figure 5. Results with the zero cost
3.2 Income inequality and market outcomes with convex cost function
Matto (1993) proved that with the quadratic form of quality-cost function, the firms will make
vertical differentiation under the quality-Cournot model. It is difficult to obtain explicit results with
the quadratic cost function while assuming a general income distribution. In this section, we try
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three types of the income distributions, i.e. uniform, triangular, and lognormal distributions. Firstly,
we follow the Benassi, Chirco, and Colombo (2006) to explore the effects of the change of income
inequality through comparing the results between the uniform distribution (high income inequality)
and the triangular distribution (low income inequality). Secondly, we follow the Yurko (2011) and
study the results with the lognormal distributions of different variances. In both analysis, we assume
the quality-cost function in the first stage of the game as C(S) = 12S
2. Our analysis shows the same
results with the methods of Benassi, Chirco, and Colombo (2006) and Yurko (2011).
3.2.1 Results with uniform and triangular types of income distribution
The PDF and variance of the uniform and triangular distributions are described as the followings:
(1) Uniform distribution
θ ∈ [0, 1] , f(θ) = 1, σ2 = 112
(2) Triangular distribution

f(θ) = 4θ θ ∈ [0, 12 ]
f(θ) = 4− 4θ θ ∈ ( 12 , 1]
σ2 = 124
(14)
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Figure 6. Uniform and triangular distributions
With the uniform income distribution, following the results of the second stage in section 3.1.1 we
get the following profit functions in the second stage:

V1 =
S1S
2
2
(4S2−S1)2 − 12S21
V2 =
S2(2S2−S1)2
(4S2−S1)2 − 12S22
(15)
Then solve for the equilibrium vertical differentiation and quality levels by firm 1 and 2, we get:

k∗ ≡ S∗1S2 = 0.358111
S∗1 = 0.0902225
S∗2 = 0.25194
(16)
And the sales volume by each firm is solved as:

X∗1 = 0.27
X∗2 = 0.45
(17)
With the triangular income distribution, as discussed in the section 3.3, the possible cases of the
locations of θL and θI given any values of the S1 and S2 include: [1]θL and θI ∈ [0, 12 ]; and [2] θL ∈ [0, 12 ]
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and θI ∈ ( 12 , 1]. The profit functions for both firms in the second stage of the game are as followings:
pi1 =
√
2
2 (1−X1 −X2)
1
2S1X1
pi2 =
√
2
2 (S2 − S1)(1−X2)
1
2X2 +
√
2
2 (1−X1 −X2)
1
2S1X2 for X2 ≥ 12
pi2 = (S2 − S1)(1−
√
2
2 X
1
2
2 )X2 +
√
2
2 (1−X1 −X2)
1
2S1X2 for X2 <
1
2
(18)
Take first order conditions with respect to X1 and X2 , we solve for the optimal X
∗
1 and X
∗
2 as:
X∗1 =
2
9+2(
√
3−3)k for k < 0.633975
X∗2 =
6+2(
√
3−3)k
9+(5
√
3−9)k for k < 0.633975
X∗1 =
2
3 [1− f(k)] for k ≥ 0.633975
X∗2 = f(k) for k ≥ 0.633975
(19)
where k ≡ S1S2 and f(k) ≡
2
3k
2
2
3k
2+[
√
17−12√2
8 (1−k)2+k2− 4−3
√
2
4 (1−k)]2
.
Then the profit functions in the first stage are:

V1 =
√
2
2 (1−X∗1 −X∗2 )
1
2S1X
∗
1 − 12S21
V2 =
√
2
2 (S2 − S1)(1−X∗2 )
1
2X∗2 +
√
2
2 (1−X∗1 −X∗2 )
1
2S1X
∗
2 − 12S22 for X∗2 ≥ 12
V2 = (S2 − S1)(1−
√
2
2 X
∗ 12
2 )X
∗
2 +
√
2
2 (1−X∗1 −X∗2 )
1
2S1X
∗
2 − 12S22 for X∗2 < 12
(20)
Then we solve the equilibrium vertical differentiation and the optimal quality levels chosen by the
firm 1 and 2 as:

k∗ ≡ S∗1S2 = 1
S∗1 = 0.22
S∗2 = 0.22
(21)
And then the sales of the firms are solved directly as:
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
X∗1 = 0.4
X∗2 = 0.4
(22)
Comparing the results between both distributions, we found that when the income distribution
gets more dispersed (higher income inequality), the vertical differentiation becomes higher, average
quality level becomes lower, and the total sales volume of the firms decreases. In next section, we will
show that these findings are also obtained with the variety of the lognormal distributions.
3.2.2 Results with lognormal type of income distribution
Figure 7. Lognormal distributions with different variances
As the computation in the quality-Cournot model involves the inverse distribution of the lognormal
distribution, thus it is difficult to compute the results in the continuous real value range, so we assume
the choice sets of k ≡ S1S2 , and S2 as following: k ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}, and
S2∈ {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 3.5, 4, 4.5, 5}. For the range of the income inequality levels, we choose µ ∈
[0.75235, 2.04435] ,σ ∈ [0.27, 1.63] or the Gini coefficient ranging from 0.15 to 0.75. The reason
for choosing this range is that the Gini coefficients of most countries are located in this range. In
addition, we continue to assume the mean of consumer’s income constant. Then the equilibrium
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results associated with different distributions are described in Figure 8. (Also see the Table 3 and 4 in
Appendix)
Figure 8. Results with the convex quality-cost
The figure 8 reports the results when the parameter of the cost function equals to 0.5, i.e. C(S) =
cS2 and c = 0.5. From the table above, we found two patterns: the vertical differentiation slightly
increases (at least non-decreasing) in the income inequality level ; and the quality levels chosen by both
firms decrease in the income inequality level. Compared with the findings under the quality-Bertrand
model by Yurko (2011), there are two main differences: firstly, in Yurko (2011), the average quality
level decreases in the income inequality, but under the quality-Cournot model, the average quality
level increases in the income inequality; secondly, in Yurko (2011) the vertical differentiation level
decreases in the income inequality, but in this paper, the vertical differentiation level increases in the
income inequality when the cost function is convex and constant when the quality-cost is negligible.
We also test the robustness of the results with the other values for c, i.e. c = 0.1 and 0.25. The
results hold robust under all the cases we tested, but if the cost scale is too large, e.g. c > 0.75, the
increase of the vertical differentiation level in the income inequality will not be significant. That’s
because when the cost for quality improvement is too high, the change of the marginal revenue from
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the variety of the income distribution will be negligible compared to the cost. In conservative sense,
we could conclude that the vertical differentiation level is non-decreasing in the income inequality and
significantly increasing in the latter term when the cost for quality improvement is not too high.
The reason for the differences of the results between the two studies is that the intensity of the
quantity competition is quite lower than that of the price competition. When the income inequality
level is low, the consumers are relatively more concentrated. Under the price competition, the con-
centration of the consumers would enhance the competition between the firms. Thus, the low quality
firm would choose much low level of the quality to differentiate itself from the high quality firm. When
the income inequality is high, the intensity of the competition will be alleviated, then the low type
firm will raise up its product’s quality to attract more high type consumers. Contrarily, under the
quantity competition, the intensity of the competition between the firms is much lower than the price
competition. Thus, the dominated factors affecting the choice of the quality levels become the cost
structure of the quality-improvement and the characteristics of the income distribution. Firstly, we
separate the consumers into three groups: high income group, middle income group, and low income
group. From the results regarding the market separation we know that the competition between both
firms takes place in the middle income group, thus the density of the consumers in the middle income
group determines the market outcomes. When the income inequality level is low, the density of the
middle-income consumers will be relatively high. In this case, it is easy for the firms to expand the sales
volume by increasing the quality level. In another words, the firms can expand revenue with relatively
low cost. However, if the income inequality is high, the density of the middle-income consumers will
be low. Thus it becomes more costly to attract the consumers by improving the quality. In this case,
both firms will choose to save the expenditures on the quality-improvement rather than expanding the
sales.
Another pattern of the results is that the low quality firm decrease more in quality level than the
high quality firm with the increasing of the income inequality. In another words, the vertical differ-
entiation increases in the income inequality. The mechanism that leads to this result is as followings:
when the income inequality increases, the sales of the both firms decrease, but at the same time the
costumers of the high quality products get richer; then the price of the high quality products doesn’t
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drop as dramatically as the low quality products; in this case, the marginal revenue of the quality-
improvement for the high quality firm is higher than that for the low quality firm; and thus the high
quality firm doesn’t need to reduce the quality as much as the low quality firm to save the cost.
3.3 Discussion on the price, profit and number of firms
From table 4, we can see that the price and profits for both firms decrease in the income inequality.
The intuition behind the results is as following. When the income inequality increases, the density of
the high and low income consumers increases meanwhile the middle income class declines. As each
consumer is assumed to purchase one unit of the product, the movement of the consumers from the
middle income class to the high income class will not change the demand of the products, however the
flows of the middle income consumers to the low income group will reduce the size of the group which
could be affordable of the products. It means that some consumers will deviate from purchasing the
products. If the price and quality of the firms do not change, the total market scale will inevitably
shrink. In this case, the firms need to adjust their price and quality downwards in order to satisfy the
shrink of the market demand.
Before discussing the equilibrium number of firms existing in the free-entry market, we need to
assume that each firm needs to make the sunk entry cost. Without loss of generality and simplify our
analysis, we only look at the case when the competition type turns from the duopolistic market to the
monopolistic market. In our simulation case, the profit of the low type firm is always lower than that
of the high type firm. In the difination range of the Gini coefficient, i.e. Gini ∈ [0.15, 0.75] , when the
sunk cost is lower than 0.29, then there will be two firms in the market. If the sunk cost is between
0.29 and 0.79, then there will be two firms in the market when the income inequality is low but only
one firm in the market when the income inequality is high enough. That means the number of the
firms in the market decrease in the income inequality.
In next section, we will do some empirical test on our predictions about the firm’s price strategy
and the equilibrium number of the firms.
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4 Empirics
We used the Chinese export firm data, from the years 2001 and 2006. The data set is retrieved from
the replicated data set by Fan et al. (2015). We test how the products’ average price and the firm
number change in response to the variety of the Gini coefficients of the destination countries. The
estimation formula is specified as followings.
Pijkt = α+ β ∗GINIkt +Xiγ1 + Zktγ2 + δt + ηj + εijkt (23)
Njkt = α+ β ∗GINIkt + Zktγ + δt + ηj + εjkt (24)
The empirical results show that the average price and number of firms decrease in the income
inequality.
5 Extensions
5.1 Welfare comparison under the Constant marginal quality-cost
The purpose of this section is to make some extensions of the Matto (1993), which compares the
social welfare between the Cournot and Bertrand models under the quadratic quality-cost function.
Matto (1993) found that with the convex cost function, the social welfare of the Bertrand model
is always higher than the Cournot model. However, Matto (1993) also claimed that the welfare
comparison result may be inverse under other type of the cost structure. In this section, we will
check this statement with the constant marginal cost function, i.e. C(S) = cS, where the parameter c
captures the scale of the marginal cost. To simplify the analysis, following Matto (1993), we assume
the consumer’s preference is uniformly distributed at θ ∈ [0, 1]. The direct computation results show
that with constant marginal quality-cost function, with the cost level high enough, the Cournot model
is more efficient than the Bertrand model in terms of social welfare.
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With this cost structure, the direct computation results for both the Cournot and Bertrand models
are as followings.
Cournot model:

S∗1 = S
∗
2 = S¯
X∗1 = X
∗
2 =
1
3
P ∗1 = P
∗
2 =
1
3 S¯
V ∗1 = V
∗
2 = [
1
9 − c]S¯
(25)
Bertrand model:

S∗1 = k
∗S∗2
S∗2 = S¯
X∗1 =
1
4−k∗
X∗2 =
2
4−k∗
P ∗1 =
k∗(1−k∗)
4−k∗
P ∗2 =
2(1−k∗)
4−k∗
(26)
where k∗ is solved from 4−7k
∗
(4−k∗)3 = c.
The social welfare is composed by the directed summation of the consumer’s surplus and the firm’s
profits. Specifically, the equation for the social welfare is:
W =
1
2δ
[
∫ θI
θL
(S1θ − P1)dθ +
∫ 1
θI
(S2θ − P2)dθ] + P1X1 + P2X2 − S1c− S2c (27)
where θI denotes the type of consumer who is indifferent between choosing low and high quality
products and θL denotes the lowest type of consumer who purchases the low quality products.
Denote the social welfare with the Cournot model as WC and with Bertrand model as WB , then
it is easy to compute the relevant social welfare as:
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
WC = ( 49 − 2c)S
WB = [ 32 · 4−k
∗2
(4−k∗)2 − (k∗ + 1)c]S¯
(28)
WB is an increasing function of k∗. When c goes to zero, k∗goes to 47 , and W
B goes to 1532 and
WC goes to 49 . As
15
32 >
4
9 , so if the marginal cost is small enough, then the welfare with the Bertrand
model will be higher than the Cournot model. However when c goes to 116 , then k
∗goes to 0, and
WBgoes to 516 and W
C goes to 2372 . As
5
16 <
23
72 , so with enough high marginal cost, the welfare of
the Cournot model will surpass the Bertrand model. In another paper, Hackner (2000) claimed that
the if the number of firms in the market is greater than two, then prices may be higher under the
price competition than the quantity competition, thus the social welfare associated with the quantity
competition may be higher than the price competition under this condition. However, this statement
is hard to test under the vertical differentiation model, because it is difficult to get explicit results
from the quality-Cournot model with more than two firms.
5.2 Within-firm vertical differentiation
In the previous sections, we assume that one firm can only choose single level of quality and the
quality differentiation is between the firms. Here, I would like to discuss the situation where the firm is
allowed to choose more than one level of the quality. In another words, the quality differentiation can
be made within the single firm. This is a more general assumption which is more closed to the reality.
We will discuss this issue by the following steps: firstly, we discuss the case with only one firm in the
market who can choose two different levels of the quality and then decide the quantity or the price of
the products; secondly, we allow the two firms existing in the market and each firm can choose two
levels of the quality. In the first step, as the decision is made by only one firm, thus the results will
be no different between choosing the quantity or price strategy. To make the analysis more robust, we
still try both the quantity and price strategies.
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5.2.1 The monopolistic market with fixed cost function in the second stage
Firstly, we will discuss the behaviors of the firms under the monopolistic market. The question is
whether the firm will provide various qualities under the monopolistic market. Again, without loss of
generality, we assume that S1 ≤ S2. In this case, if the firm invests in the quality-improvement up to
the level S2, then the cost for the firm to provide quality S1 would be zero. This feature is different
from the case with two firms in the market where both the S1 and S2 need the investment. The cost
function of improving the quality is assumed as the convex form C(S1, S2) with the properties such
that ∂C(S1,S2)∂S1 = 0,
∂C(S1,S2)
∂S2
< 0 and ∂
2C(S1,S2)
∂S22
≥ 0. In this case, the profits functions in the first and
second stages can be written as the followings.
If the firm chooses the quantity-strategies, we have:
pi = S1X1(1−X1 −X2) +X2[(1−X2)S2 − S1X1]− C(S1, S2) (29)
Take first order conditions, we have:

X∗1 = 0
X∗2 =
1
2
(30)
Thus, with the quantity-strategies, the firm will only provide the high quality product.
With the price-strategies, we have:
pi = P1(
P2 − P1
S2 − S1 −
P1
S1
) + P2[1− P2 − P1
S2 − S1 ]− C(S1, S2) (31)
Take first order conditions with respect to P1 and P2, and then take first order conditions with
respect to S1 and S2 , we have:
26

P ∗1 =
1
2S1
P ∗2 =
1
2S2
S∗1 = S2
f(S∗2 ) =
1
4
(32)
where f(S2) ≡ ∂C(S1,S2)∂S2 .
As S∗1 = S2, thus the firm will provide only the high quality product with the price-strategies as
well.
5.2.2 The monopolistic market with the variable cost in the second stage
In this section, we will adjust the cost function from the previous section. The cost function here is
assumed to be associated with both the quantity and quality of the products, i.e. C(S,X) = c(S) ·X,
where X is the quantity of the products, and c′(S) > 0. That means the variable cost of each unit
of the products is positive and also positively correlated with the quality level. This assumption can
be found easily in the reality, for example, the luxury car is more expensive than the normal quality
car because the components of the car are expensive. Based on this setting, we can write the profits
function of the firm as followings.
Based on the quantity-strategies, we have the profits function as:
pi = S1X1(1−X1 −X2) +X2[(1−X2)S2 − S1X1]− c(S1) ·X1 − c(S2) ·X2 (33)
Take first order conditions of the formula (31) with respect to X1 and X2 , we get:

X∗1 =
S1c(S2)−S2c(S1)
2S1·(S2−S1)
X∗2 =
S2−S1−[c(S2)−c(S1)]
2(S2−S1)
(34)
Based on the price strategies, we have the profits function as:
pi = [P1 − c(S1)](P2 − P1
S2 − S1 −
P1
S1
) + [P2 − c(S2)](1− P2 − P1
S2 − S1 ) (35)
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Take first order conditions of the formula (33) with respect to P1 and P2, we get:

P ∗1 =
1
2c(S1) +
1
2S1
P ∗2 =
1
2c(S2) +
1
2S2
(36)
Both strategies will lead to the following profits function in the first stage:
pi =
[c(S1)]
2S2 − 2c(S1)c(S2)S1 + S1{2S1c(S2) + S22 − S1S2 − 2S2c(S2) + [c(S2)]2}
4S1(S2 − S1) (37)
If the cost function c(S) is linear in S, then it is easy to get that X∗1 = 0. To obtain an explicit
result with the convex cost function, we assume c(S) = 12S
2. Based on this assumption and taking
the first order conditions with respect to S1 and S2, we get:

S∗1 = 0.4
S∗2 = 0.8
(38)
Thus, the firm will differentiate the quality of the products if the cost function is non-linear and
increasing in both quantity and quality of the products.
5.2.3 The duopolistic competition market
In this section, we will discuss the structure of the cost function and the vertical differentiation
within the single firm under the duopolistic competition market. To simplify the analysis, we assume
the quality space contains only two levels of the quality, i.e. S ∈ {SL, SH} and SL ≤ SH . The cost
function is increasing in both the quality level and the quantity produced, i.e. C(S,X) = c(S) · X,
where c(S) is the cost on quality-improving and X is the quantity produced. That means the cost is
variable to both the quality level and the quantity. Denote the cost of providing high quality c(SH) as
cH and the low quality as cL, then providing X units of high quality products will generate the cost
as cH ·X and low products will cost cL ·X. Without loss of generality, we discuss the quality choice
by the firm 1 given the quality level chosen by the firm 2. Generally, there are three possibilities of
choices by firm 2: choosing high quality only, i.e. S2 = SH ; choosing low quality only, i.e. S2 = SL;
28
and choosing both the high and low qualities, i.e. S2a = SH and S2b = SL. In the following part of
this section, we will discuss the best strategy of firm 1 in response to the choice of firm 2 and find out
the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Denote Xia as the quantity of the high quality products by
firm i and Xib is the quantity of the low quality products, where i = 1, 2.
In the case of the Bertrand model, because the competition is too intensive in the second stage,
both firms will obtain zero profits if they provide the same quality levels of the product. Thus, it is
obvious that both firms will only differentiate their own products from the other competitor and will
not differentiate their own products. In this case, we will only discuss the situation with the Cournot
competition in detail.
(1) Firm 2 chooses high quality
In this case, the profits functions of firm 1 and firm 2 are:

pi1 = X1b[SL(1−X1a −X1b −X2a − cL] +X1a[SH(1−X1a −X2a)− SLX1b]− cHX1a
pi2 = X2a[SH(1−X1a −X2a)− SLX1b − cH ]
(39)
with constraints Xi ≥ 0, where i = 1a, 1b, and 2a.
Take first order conditions with respect to X1a , X1b , and X2a, we obtain the following results:

X∗1a = max{ 0, SH−SL−cH+cL2(SH−SL) − SH−cH6SH }
X∗1b = max{ 0, SL−cL2SL − SH−SL−cH+cL2(SH−SL) }
X∗2a = max{ 0, SH−cH3SH }
(40)
(2) Firm 2 chooses both the high and low quality
In this case, the profits functions of firm 1 and firm 2 are:
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
pi1 = [SL(1−X1a −X2a −X1b −X2b)− cL]X1b + [SH(1−X1a −X2a)− SL(X1b +X2b)− cH ]X1a
pi2 = [SL(1−X1a −X2a −X1b −X2b)− cL]X2b + [SH(1−X1a −X2a)X2a − SL(X1b +X2b)− cH ]X2a
(41)
with constraints Xi ≥ 0 , where i = 1a, 1b, 2a and 2b.
Take first order with respect to X1a, X1b, X2a and X2b, we obtain the following results:

X∗1a = X
∗
2a = max{ 0, 13 [ 3S
2
H−4SLSH−4cHSL+4cLSH
(3SH−4SL)SH ]}
X∗1b = X
∗
2b = max{ 0, ( cH2SH − cL2SL ) · 2SH3SH−4SL }
(42)
(3) Firm 2 chooses the low quality
In this case, the profits functions of firm 1 and firm 2 are:

pi1 = [SL(1−X1a −X1b −X2b)− cL]X1b + [SH(1−X1a)− SL(X1b +X2b)− cH ]X1a
pi2 = [SL(1−X1a −X1b −X2b)− cL]X2b
(43)
Take first order with respect to X1a, X1b, and X2b, we obtain the following results:

X∗1a = max{ 0, 12 − cH−cL2(SH−SL)}
X∗1b = max{ 0, 3SL(cH−cL)−(SH−SL)·(SL+2cL)6SL(SH−SL) }
X∗2b = max{ 0, SL+2cL3SL }
(44)
Based on the direct computation, it is easy to obtain the necessary condition for the single firm to
make the within-firm vertical differentiation as cHSH >
cL
SL
. In another words the marginal cost must be
convex in the quality level. Next, we will show that if the cost of providing the high quality product
is not too high and the vertical differentiation is significant enough, then there will exist a sub-perfect
Nash equilibrium such that both firms will differentiate their own products.
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Proposition 3. In the duopolistic model with quality-quantity competition, if the cost function
is convex in quality, the variable cost of the high quality products is not too high, and the vertical
differentiation is large enough, i.e.

cL
SL
< cHSH
cH
SH
− cLSL < 3SH−4SL4SL
SL
SH
< 34
cH−cL
SH−SL < 1
Then there exists a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium in the market such that both firms will provide
both the high and low quality products. (See the proof in Appendix)
The intuition of the relevant results is that the firm needs to consider both the cost and the
substitute effects when deciding the provision of the product’s quality. The cost effect means that
because the marginal cost is convex in the quality level, thus the average cost in terms of both the
quality level and the quantity will be higher with the high quality level than the low quality level.
In this case, the firm will save much cost if providing the low quality products rather than the high
quality products. The substitute effect means that if the firm provides the low quality products, some
consumers who purchase the high quality products when the low quality products are absent in the
market will turn to buy the low quality products. In another words, some consumers will be attracted
from the high quality market to the low quality market. Because the marginal revenue from the high
quality product is higher than that from the low quality product, the show-up of the low quality
products will reduce the total revenue. The firms decide the quantity of the low and high quality
products by considering both the substitute and the cost effects.
6 Conclusion
The paper explores the changes of the market outcomes in response to a variety of income distri-
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bution under the quality-Cournot model . Our study found that when the quality-cost is zero and
the income inequality is not too high, then both firms will choose the highest quality level. If the
quality-cost function is convex, the average quality level will decrease and the vertical differentiation
level will increase. in the income inequality. These results are different from those of the Yurko (2011),
which assumed the quality-Bertrand competition and reached the conclusion that with both the zero
and convex quality-cost, the average quality level always increases and the vertical differentiation level
always decreases in the income inequality. The intuition of this difference is that under the price
competition, the competition is much intensive and thus the competition effects dominates the cost
effects. Contrarily, under the quantity competition case the competition is much moderate. Thus the
firms would consider more about the location of the consumers (market shares) and the benefits from
lowering the quality-cost. The paper also discusses the conditions for the single firm to choose multi-
ple levels of the product’s quality. The analytical results show that the necessary conditions for the
firms to make within-firm vertical differentiation include: the vertical differentiation between the high
and low qualities is large enough; the marginal production cost is small enough; and the quality-cost
function is convex.
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Appendix
Proof of the lemma 1:
Define functions ν1(S1) ≡ ∂V1∂S1 and ν2(S2) ≡ ∂V2∂S2 . As ∂
2V1
∂S21
> 0 and the minimum value of ν1(S1) is
ν1min = ν1(0) =
1
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(µ+δ)2
δ ≥ 18µ ≥ 0, so ν1(S1) > 0 for all S1 ∈ [0, S2]. Thus, the maximum value of
V1 is obtained at S
∗
1 = S2. Given the best strategy of firm 1, ν2(S2) > 0 for any S2 ∈ [0, S¯]. Thus the
highest value of V2 is obtained at S2 = S¯. In this case, both firms will entry the market and choose
the same highest level of the quality. More detailed proof can be found in Bonanno (1986).
Q.E.D.
Proof of the proposition 1:
As the discussion above, when θ
+
θ− ∈ (4,+∞), the unique perfect Nash equilibrium exists, X∗1 and
X∗2are obtained as (11) to (14) with the constraints X1 +X2 < 1. And it is obviously that no firm will
deviate from the equilibrium with choosing an alternative pair (Si, Xi), for i = 1, 2. More detailed
proof can be found in Bonanno (1986) and Motta (1993).
Now we focus the situation when θ
+
θ− ∈ [0, 3] and θ
+
θ− ∈ (3, 4]. As P1 ≥ S1θ−, that is equivalent
to have the constraint X1 + X2 ≤ 1. Without loss of generality, we continue to have the assumption
S1 ≤ S2. In the second stage of the competition the profits functions of firm 1 and 2 are pi1 =
S1X1[θ
+− (θ+−θ−) · (X1 +X2)] and pi2 = X2[(θ+− (θ+−θ−) ·X2)S2− (θ+−θ−) ·S1X1] respectively.
With the constraint X1 +X2 ≤ 1, we can get the following quantity strategies for firm 1 and 2.

X1 =
θ+
2(θ+−θ−) − 12X2 if θ
+
2(θ+−θ−) +
1
2X2 < 1
X1 = 1−X2 otherwise
(45)

X2 =
θ+
2(θ+−θ−) − S12S2X1 if θ
+
2(θ+−θ−) +
2S2−S1
2S2
X1 < 1
X2 = 1−X1 otherwise
(46)
If we substitute the first equation of (44) into the first equation of (43), we can get the following
result X1 + X2 =
θ+
θ+−θ− (
3S2−S1
4S2−S1 ). With the range
θ+
θ− ∈ [0, 3] and the condition 0 < S1 ≤ S2(both
firms entry the market), this result is greater than 1, i.e. X1 + X2 > 1, violating the constraint that
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X1+X2 ≤ 1. Thus it is obviously that both firms will choose the strategies X∗1 = 1−X2 if X2 ≥ θ
+−2θ−
θ+−θ−
and X∗2 = 1 − X1 if X1 ≥ S22S2−S1 · θ
+−2θ−
θ+−θ− respectively. In this case, if
S2
2S2−S1 · θ
+−2θ−
4θ+−θ− <
θ−
θ+−θ− ,
there will be unlimited number of equilibria, i.e. (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ⊆ {(X1, X2) | X1 + X2 = 1, X1 ∈
[ S22S2−S1 · θ
+−2θ−
θ+−θ− ,
θ−
θ+−θ− ],X2 ∈ [ θ
+−2θ−
θ+−θ− ,
2S2θ
+−2(θ+−θ−)S1
2(θ+−θ−)·(2S2−S1) ]}. It is easy to see that in the range
θ+
θ− ∈ (3, 4], if firm 1 chooses relative high level of S1 the Nash equilibrium is unique, and if firm 1
choose relative low level of S1 the number of Nash equilibria is uncountable. Thus the payoffs of both
firms are uncertain if firm 1 chooses relative low level of S1. In this case, we cannot figure out whether
firm 1 will choose high or low level of quality. Then the number of Nash equilibria in the second stage
will be uncertain.
Q.E.D.
Proof the proposition 2:
Denote the area θ ∈ [0, θm) as I, and the area θ ∈ [θm, θ¯] as II. Denote the lowest type of consumer
who chooses the low quality product as θL and the consumer who is indifferent between choosing high
and low quality product as θI , then we have the following three possibilities of the locations of θL and
θI : (1) θL, θI ∈ I; (2) θL ∈ I, θI ∈ II; and (3) θL, θI ∈ II. In the rest part of content, we will look
at the quality choices by firms under these three conditions.
[1] θL, θI ∈ I
The profit function of firm 1 in the second stage is pi1 = S1X1G(1 − X1 − X2). Then take the
first order condition with respect to X1 we get
∂pi1
∂X1
= S1G(1−X1 −X2)− S1X1g(1−X1 −X2) = 0,
and the second order condition is ∂
2pi1
∂X21
= −2S1g(1 −X1 −X2) + S1X1g′(1 −X1 −X2) < 0, thus the
best strategy of firm 1 in response to the action of firm 2 as X∗1 =
G(1−X∗1−X2)
g(1−X∗1−X2) . As g
′(Ω) < 0 when
Ω ∈ [0, F (θm)], thus when X2 increases, then X∗1 must decrease, i.e. −1 < ∂X
∗
1
∂X2
< 0. The profits of firm
2 is pi2 = X2[(S2−S1)G(1−X2)+S1G(1−X1−X2)]. Take first order condition with respect to X2, we
get ∂pi2∂X2 = (S2−S1)[G(1−X2)−X2g(1−X2)]+S1[G(1−X1−X2)−X2g(1−X1−X2)] = 0 and the second
order condition ∂
2pi2
∂X22
= (S2−S1)[X2g′(1−X2)−2g(1−X2)]+S1[X2g′(1−X1−X2)−2g(1−X1−X2)] < 0.
Thus the optimal choice of firm 2 is X∗2 =
S1[G(1−X1−X∗2 )−G(1−X∗2 )]+S2G(1−X∗2 )
S1[g(1−X1−X∗2 )−g(1−X∗2 )]+S2g(1−X∗2 ) . As −1 <
∂X∗1
∂X2
< 0, so
it is easy to get that
∂X∗2
∂S1
< 0. When S1 increases, the value of the right hand side of the equation
decreases, because G(1−X1 −X∗2 )−G(1−X∗2 ) < 0 and g(1−X1 −X∗2 )− g(1−X∗2 ) > 0. The only
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way to make the equality holds again is to decrease the value of X2. Thus, in the first stage of the
game, we have ∂pi1∂S1 = −g(1−X∗1 −X∗2 )
∂X∗2
∂S1
S1X
∗
1 +G(1−X∗1 −X∗2 )X∗2 > 0. In this case, S∗1 = S2.
[2] θL ∈ I, θI ∈ II
As pi2 = X2[(S2−S1)G(1−X2)+S1G(1−X1−X2)], so we take first order condition with respect to
X2, then get
∂pi2
∂X2
= (S2−S1)[G(1−X2)−X2g(1−X2)] +S1[G(1−X1−X2)−X2g(1−X1−X2)] = 0
and the second order condition ∂
2pi2
∂X22
= (S2 − S1)[X2g′(1 − X2) − 2g(1 − X2)] + S1[X2g′(1 − X1 −
X2) − 2g(1 − X1 − X2)] < 0 under the condition [1 − F (θ)]−f
′(θ)
[f(θ)]2 ≤ 2 for θ ∈ [θm, θ¯]. Set H(·) =
( 1k−1)[G(1−X2)−g(1−X2)X2]+[G(1−X1−X2)−g(1−X1−X2)X2] = 0, where k ≡ S1S2 is the strategy
of firm 1. It is easy to get that ∂H()∂k = − 1k2 [G(1−X2)−g(1−X2)X2] and ∂H()∂X2 = −g(1−X1−X2) +
[g′(1−X1−X2)X2−g(1−X1−X2)](∂X
∗
1
∂X2
+1)−( 1k−1)[2g(1−X2)−X2g′(1−X2)]. As [1−F (θ)]−f
′(θ)
[f(θ)]2 ≤ 2
for θ ∈ [θm, θ¯] and [1−F (θ)]θf(θ) ≤ 1 for θ ∈ [θm, θ¯], so it is easy to see that both∂H()∂k < 0, ∂H()∂X2 < 0.
Thus ∂X2∂k = −[∂H()∂k ]/[∂H()∂X2 ] < 0. As pi1 = S1X1G(1 − X1 − X2) = kS2X1G(1 − X1 − X2), so
∂pi1
∂k = S2X1G(1−X1 −X2)− kS2X1g(1−X1 −X2)∂X2∂k > 0. In this case the best choice of firm 1 is
such that k∗ = 1.
[3] θL, θI ∈ II
In this case, ∂pi1∂X1 = S1G(1−X1−X2)−S1X1g(1−X1−X2) > 0 because
[1−F (θ)]
θf(θ) ≤ 1 for θ ∈ [θm, θ¯].
Then the game goes back to the case [2], and then the best choice of firm 1 is such that k∗ = 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of the proposition 3:
With the conditions listed in the proposition 3, the best responses of firm 1 under cases (1), (2),
and (3) are choosing both high and low quality, choosing both high and low quality, and choosing only
high quality respectively. Thus, no matter what strategies of firm 2 chooses, choosing low quality only
is dominated strategy for firm 1. Because firm 1 and firm 2 are symmetric, both firms will not choose
the strategy that choosing the low quality only. Given the potential strategies chosen by the opponent,
the best response for both firms is choosing both the high and low quality.
Q.E.D.
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Gini k∗ S∗1 S
∗
2 S˜
0.15 1 5 5 5
0.2 1 5 5 5
0.25 1 5 5 5
0.3 1 5 5 5
0.35 1 5 5 5
0.4 1 5 5 5
0.45 1 5 5 5
0.5 1 5 5 5
0.55 1 5 5 5
0.6 1 5 5 5
0.65 1 5 5 5
0.7 1 5 5 5
0.75 1 5 5 5
0.8 1 5 5 5
0.85 1 5 5 5
Table 1. The quality with the zero cost
Gini P ∗1 P
∗
2 X
∗
1 X
∗
2 pi1 pi2
0.15 15.4 15.4 0.47 0.47 7.20 7.20
0.2 23.2 23.2 0.45 0.45 10.55 10.55
0.25 21.3 21.3 0.44 0.44 9.37 9.37
0.3 19.5 19.5 0.42 0.42 8.28 8.28
0.35 18.2 18.2 0.41 0.41 7.45 7.45
0.4 16.9 16.9 0.39 0.39 6.65 6.65
0.45 16.5 16.5 0.37 0.37 6.17 6.17
0.5 14.9 14.9 0.36 0.36 5.32 5.32
0.55 13.9 13.9 0.34 0.34 4.65 4.65
0.6 13.2 13.2 0.32 0.32 4.17 4.17
0.65 12.4 12.4 0.29 0.29 3.67 3.67
0.7 11.7 11.7 0.27 0.27 3.17 3.17
0.75 11.1 11.1 0.24 0.24 2.71 2.71
0.8 10.5 10.5 0.22 0.22 2.28 2.28
0.85 9.8 9.8 0.19 0.19 1.82 1.82
Table 2. The price and quantity with zero cost
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Gini k∗ S∗1 S
∗
2 S˜
0.15 0.5 2.5 5 3.75
0.2 0.5 2.25 4.5 3.375
0.25 0.5 2 4 3
0.3 0.5 1.75 3.5 2.625
0.35 0.5 1.5 3 2.25
0.4 0.4 1.2 3 2.1
0.45 0.4 1.2 3 2.1
0.5 0.4 1 2.5 1.75
0.55 0.4 1 2.5 1.75
0.6 0.4 0.8 2 1.4
0.65 0.4 0.8 2 1.4
0.7 0.4 0.8 2 1.4
0.75 0.4 0.6 1.5 1.05
Table 3. The quality with the convex cost function
Gini P ∗1 P
∗
2 X
∗
1 X
∗
2 pi1 pi2
0.15 12.1 30 0.34 0.62 0.99 6.10
0.2 9.7 25.3 0.34 0.6 0.78 5.04
0.25 7.8 21.3 0.35 0.56 0.74 4.01
0.3 6.2 17.8 0.35 0.53 0.68 3.31
0.35 5.0 14.8 0.36 0.50 0.65 2.87
0.4 3.7 15.1 0.35 0.48 0.56 2.70
0.45 3.7 15.3 0.35 0.43 0.56 2.09
0.5 2.8 12.8 0.35 0.39 0.47 1.86
0.55 2.8 13.3 0.33 0.34 0.42 1.37
0.6 2.2 11.2 0.32 0.30 0.39 1.31
0.65 2.3 12.1 0.30 0.25 0.36 1.02
0.7 2.4 13.5 0.27 0.20 0.33 0.73
0.75 2.0 11.8 0.24 0.16 0.29 0.73
Table 4. The price and quantity with the convex cost function
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(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES log(Price) log(Price)−average log(Firm−number)
GINI -0.00767*** -0.00854*** -0.00748***
(0.000490) (0.000700) (0.000416)
tariff 0.153** 0.0819 -1.130***
(0.0707) (0.103) (0.0615)
log(CPI) 0.0261*** 0.0180** -0.109***
(0.00561) (0.00794) (0.00473)
log(GDP ) 0.0307*** 0.100*** 0.250***
(0.00264) (0.00408) (0.00243)
log(GDP−pc) -0.000874 0.0114 -0.0824***
(0.00789) (0.0108) (0.00641)
TFP -0.0402***
(0.00670)
HHI 0.132*
(0.0780)
log(labor) -0.102***
(0.00678)
log(sales) 0.0947***
(0.00760)
capital−labor−ratio 0.0124***
(0.00367)
log(wage) 0.272***
(0.00702)
Constant -1.176 -2.593** -4.829***
(0.827) (1.043) (0.620)
Observations 149,229 44,229 44,229
R-squared 0.723 0.833 0.523
Time FE YES YES YES
Industry FE YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4. Price, firm number and the income inequality of the destination countries
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